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WHEN SMOKE GETS IN YOUR EYES:
PROPOSED RATIFICATION BY THE UNITED STATES OF THE
GENEVA PROTOCOL ON CHEMICAL-BIOLOGICAL
WARFARE
INTRODUCTION

In May, 1974, the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and
Scientific Developments of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the
House of Representatives opened hearings on the chemical and biological warfare policy of the United States. The future direction of
this policy has been a matter of considerable national and international
attention since November, 1969, when President Nixon announced
the unilateral renunciation by the United States of the production
and stockpiling of biological weapons and toxins, and the intention of
the United States to ratify the 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases,
and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare. Although Mr. Nixon's
announcement was seen as a major breakthrough for chemical-biological disarmament, its promise has not yet been fulfilled. When in
August, 1970, the President submitted the Geneva Protocol to the
Senate for its advice and consent to ratification, he did so with the
"understanding" that the prohibition of the Protocol did not extend
to tear gases and herbicides which at that time were being used extensively by United States forces in Vietnam. The Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, after holding lengthy hearings on the Geneva
Protocol and the military and political significance of the use of tear
gas and herbicides, disagreed with this interpretation. In April, 1972,
Senator Fulbright, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee,
wrote to the President asking him to reconsider the desirability of
an "understanding" with respect to tear gas and herbicides, and requested that several studies on the use of these chemicals in Vietnam
be made available to the Committee. To date no substantive response
has been received from the Administration, and the issue appears
stalemated.
In the meantime, other developments at home and abroad have
made imperative the swift resolution of this conflict in interpretation.
On April 10, 1972, a Convention for the Prohibition of Development,
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Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons
was concluded under which all signatory nations agreed not to develop, produce, stockpile or retain biological weapons, and to destroy
within nine months of accession any existing stocks; on August 10,
1972, the Convention was submitted to the Senate. Since the United
States is one of the depository nations, its ratification is necessary for
the Convention to enter into effect; but as yet the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee has not taken any action. This is apparently
because of its disagreement with the Administration over the interpretation of the scope of the Geneva Protocol's chemical warfare
prohibition.
Important talks on chemical disarmament are also currently
underway in Geneva at the United Nations Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (hereinafter referred to as CCD). The negotiations there are stalled primarily because of disagreement between
the United States and the Soviet Union over proposed methods of
disarmament verification and the question of which chemicals should
be considered weapons.' One commentator has suggested that there
is such pessimism about the sincerity of the United States' commitment
to disarmament that "if an agreement imposing meaningful restrictions
in the area of chemical warfare is not soon achieved the existence of the
organization will be threatened." 2 Part of this distrust of the United
States' intentions is the result of a recent Department of Defense
announcement that it is seeking funds for the production of binary
chemical weapons-weapons composed of two nonlethal gases which
combine in flight to produce a lethal nerve gas. The feeling on the
part of many nations is that while an intensive review by the Administration of the United States' chemical warfare policy is now underway,
with one possible option presumably being the complete phasing out
of all the United States' chemical warfare capability, the decision to
add to an already large stockpile of chemical weapons cannot be taken
as a sign of any serious commitment to disarmament. The position of
the Pentagon that it should push ahead with production of the binaries,
even though the review of the United States' chemical warfare policy
1. Hearing on United States Chemical Warfare Policy Before the Subcomm. on
National Security Policy and Scientific Developments of the House Comm. on Foreign
Affairs, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1974) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings].
2. Id. at 19.
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is expected to be completed within a few months, is considered particularly disheartening.
Finally, on April 30, 1974, Japan put forward a new proposal at
the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament for a phased program of disarmament. The suggested plan involves "link[ing] a particular type of prohibition, such as prohibiting production of lethal
agents only, or agreeing on abolishing stockpiles, to separate verification agreements . . . [since] the problems of verification differ, depending on what is being limited or banned." 3 It proposes that
organophosphorous nerve gases be the first chemical weapons banned
because they are the most lethal; and then that steps toward complete
disarmament be taken as agreement on effective verification measures
can be reached.4 During the May, 1974 hearings of the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments of the
House Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Japanese proposal was
mentioned repeatedly, and it appears that the Administration is giving
serious attention to it.
In light of the Japanese proposal, the current disarmament talks,
the Administration's review of the United States' chemical warfare
policy, the Defense Department's request for appropriations for production of binary weapons, and the as yet unratified Convention on
Bacteriological Weapons and Toxins, it seems more important than
ever for the Senate to give its advice and consent to the ratification
of the Geneva Protocol. Since the dispute between the Administration
and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is over the interpretation
of the scope of the Protocol's chemical warfare prohibition, it seems
particularly appropriate at this time to determine whether or not the
use of tear gas in war is prohibited by the Geneva Protocol. This
is the focus of the Comment that follows.

I.

THE MEANING OF THE YROTOCOL

The Geneva Protocol was drawn up against the backdr6p of
world revulsion to the use of chemical warfare in World War I. It
was drafted at the Conference for the Supervision of the International
Trade in Arms and Ammunition and in Implements of War (con3. Id. at 197.

4. Id. at 198.
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vened to consider the possible limitation of the international arms
trade), and was offered as a separate protocol. The United States
was the initial proponent of the Protocol, but because of Secretary
of State Kellogg's failure to enlist the participation of key senators in
the Geneva negotiations, and the active opposition to ratification of
the American Chemical Society and the United States Chemical
Warfare Service, the Senate refused to give its advice and consent to
ratification. The Protocol provides in relevant part:
Whereas, the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases,
and of all analagous liquids, materials or devices, has been justly
condemned by the general opinion of the civilized world;
Whereas the prohibition of such use has been declared in
Treaties to which the majority of Powers of the World are Parties;
and
To the end that this prohibition shall be universally accepted
as a part of International Law, binding alike the conscience and
the practices of nations;
DECLARE:
That the High Contracting Parties, so far as they are not
already Parties to Treaties prohibiting such use, accept this
prohibition, agree to extend this prohibition to the use of
bacteriological methods of warfare and agree to be bound
as between themselves according to the terms of this declaration.6
There has been considerable controversy over whether tear gas
is included within the scope of the gas warfare prohibition. In clarifying an ambiguous treaty provision it is necessary to look at its terms
in accordance with the ordinary meaning which would be given the
words in their context and in light of the treaty's purpose.0 Subsequent
agreements of the parties to the treaty as to its interpretation, and subsequent practice which indicates the parties' attitude toward its interpretation are also to be considered. 7 If there is still ambiguity as to
meaning, one may look at the travaux preparatoiresand the circumstances of the treaty's conclusion.8 To satisfy this inquiry, the following
may be examined: the treaties preceding the Geneva Protocol which
5. 94 L.N.T.S. 65, 69 (1929), opened for signature June 17, 1925.
6. Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31, 1 1, opened for signature May 23,
1969, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27 (1969).

7. Id.

3(a), (b).

8. Id. art. 32.
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shed light on the meaning of the language used in the Protocol-the
Treaty of Washington of 1922 and the Treaty of Versailles of 1919,
the negotiating history of the Protocol itself, and the subsequent conduct of the parties to the treaty which indicates a definite interpretation of the Protocol. There are two caveats which must be borne in
mind throughout the forthcoming analysis. The first is that "the
Geneva Protocol is not a tax statute or a deed for the transfer of land,"
and the narrow approach to interpretation which would be appropriate
for that type of legal document is not appropriate for a treaty in which
the signers' intent plays a very large role.9 Second, one must at all times
distinguish the evidence which is relevant to the interpretation of the
Geneva Protocol itself and that evidence which is determinative of
the customary international law prohibition of gas warfare. "If one is
guided by this principle in analyzing the chemical warfare prohibitions
of the Geneva Protocol, many of the doubts regarding its intended
scope disappear. ' 1°
A. Treaty of Versailles
Primarily because of Senate objections to the provisions for the
League of Nations contained therein, the United States did not become
a party to the Treaty of Versailles. However, the United States did
participate in the negotiations leading up to the Treaty which included
a ban on chemical warfare. Article 171 of the Versailles Treaty stated
that "the use of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and all analagous liquids, materials or devices being prohibited, their manufacture and importation are strictly forbidden in Germany."" The
question of whether tear gas is included within the scope of this prohibition is raised by the discrepancy between the French and English
texts, since the French text uses the word "similaires" in place of
"other." Proponents (notably the United States government) 12 of
the view that this difference is significant have suggested that the
9. Hearings on the Protocol for the Prohibitionof the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous, or Other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare Before the
Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 92d Gong., 1st Sess. 61 (1972) [hereinafter cited
as Senate Hearings].
10. Baxter & Buergenthal, Legal Aspects of the Geneva Protocol of 1925, 64 Amu.
J. INT'L L. 853, 856 (1970).

11. Id. at 857.
12. Id.

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
French text requires that all gases prohibited have effects similar to
those of poison and asphyxiating gases, and that therefore tear gas,
which is much less deleterious than these gases and therefore dissimilar, is excluded. Other writers have suggested that the discrepancy
between "similaires" and "other" is not significant, noting that in
Article 172 of the Treaty, which requires Germany to inform the Allies
of "the nature and mode of all explosives, toxic substances or other
like chemical preparations used by them in the war," it is the English
version which is more narrow, and the French "aiutre preparations
chemiques" which is broadly prohibitory. 13 There are several conclusions which can be drawn from this ambiguity. The first is that
"[s]ince both languages are authentic, it would be impossible to say
which is the correct interpretation." 14 Another, perhaps more tenuous,
is that in light of the fact that both the British and French texts used
broadly prohibitive language at least once, the prohibition should
be interpreted broadly, in the absence of any concrete indication
to the contrary, and in light of the fact that tear gases were used
heavily in World War I. A third view is that
the term "similaires" might have been meant to qualify the broad
prohibition against the use of all gas "in war" to prohibit only the use
of gas in any form as a weapon against man . . . but not to prohibit
other uses of gas "in war" such as the use of helium in barrage
balloonsY5
Another argument against a restrictive interpretation of the
French text is that "the phrase 'gaz toxiques' includes, as a matter of
French usage, all chemical weapons that are employed for their toxic
effect on living organisms. It thus applies to such irritant chemicals
as tear gas."' 16 Yet this reading has been questioned, since "if gaz
toxiques was meant initially to be an all inclusive category, the specific
companion prohibitions of gaz asphyxiantes . . . ou similaires would
seem superfluous." 17
13. Id. at 858 (emphasis in original).
14. SuscoAni. oN NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY AND SCIENTIFIC DEVELOPMENTS
OF THE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COIetm., CBW: U.S. POLICIES AND INTERNATIONAL
EFFECTS, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1970) (including an appended study, C. Gellner &
L. Wu, The Use of Tear Gas in War, id. at 11) [hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT].
15. Moore, Ratification of the Geneva Protocol on Gas and Bacteriological Warfare, 58 VA. L. REv. 419, 455-56 (1972); see discussion on Washington Treaty in
text accompanying notes 26-28 infra.
16. Baxter & Buergenthal, supra note 10, at 856 n.16.
17. Moore, supra note 15, at 455.
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Another argument against a broad interpretation of the prohibition which Article 171 of the Treaty imposes is that that article states
that the use of "asphyxiating, poisonous or- other gases" is already
prohibited, and an examination of earlier gas treaties discloses no mention of tear gas.
[T]he Hague Gas Declaration of 1899 ... prohibited "the use of ...
asphyxiating or deleterious gases." However, both the British and
the French believed that this language did not include tear gas.

[n. In 1913 the British considered that the lachrymatory gas was
permitted by the wording of the declaration, "although contrary
to its spirit."] The Versailles "being prohibited" language most likely
referred to the 1907 Hague Convention rules against "poison or
poisoned weapons," against killing or wounding "treacherously,"
and against employing war material calculated to cause "unnecessary suffering ... ." [N]o authority has been found for the proposition that [the Hague Convention prohibits] the use of tear gases
in war. .

.

. Therefore, [the Treaty of Versailles] probably did not

prohibit tear gases to Germany.' 8
This argument seems weakened by its questionable reliance on the
British statement regarding lachrymatory gases, and by the heavy use
of tear gas in World War I. Since tear gas was known and used by the
Allies drafting the treaty, it seems at least arguable that had the drafters
meant to exclude tear gas from the new prohibition they were drawing
up, or felt that it did not fall within the scope of the Hague Declarations, they would have said something to this effect.
B. The Washington Treaty
The Treaty on the Use of Submarines and Noxious Gases was
drawn up at the Washington Arms Conference of 1922. At the suggestion of the American delegation, the provision of the treaty governing chemical warfare incorporated the language of the Versailles
Treaty because of the previous acceptance of that wording by many
nations. Article Five provided that:
The use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and
all analogous liquids, materials or devices, having been justly condemned by the general opinion of the civilized world and a prohibition of such use having been declared in treaties to which a
majority of the civilized Powers are parties,
18. Bunn, Banning Poison Gas and Germ Warfare, 1969 Wis. L. REv. 375,
398-99 (citations and footnotes omitted).
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The Signatory Powers, to the end that this prohibition shall
be universally accepted as a part of international law binding alike
the conscience and practice of nations, declare their assent to such
prohibition, agree to be bound thereby as between
themselves and
19
invite all other civilized nations to adhere thereto.
The Treaty was ratified by the United States, but failed to come
into effect because of France's failure to ratify due to objections to
certain of the provisions governing submarine warfare. A study of
the travaux preparatoiresindicates that the question of inclusion of
tear gas within the scope of the chemical warfare prohibition was
discussed; unfortunately, it is not conclusive as to the ultimate disposition of the issue. The technical subcommittee of the Committee on Limitation of Armaments declared that "[t]he kinds of gases
and their effects on human beings can not be taken as a basis for
limitation . . . . [T]he only limitation practicable is to wholly prohibit the use of gases against cities and other large bodies of noncombatants. . . . There could be no limitation on their use against
the armed forces of the enemy, ashore or afloat." 2 0 Both the Advisory Committee of the United States Delegation and the General
Board of the Navy disagreed. Their reports were read into the record
of the Committee on Limitation of Armaments by Secretary of State
Hughes, head of the United States delegation. The Advisory Committee's report stated that regardless of the experts' opinions, the
"conscience" of the American public demanded "the total abolition
of chemical warfare, whether in the Army or the Navy, whether
against combatant or noncombatant." 21 Indicating its desire to prohibit the use of tear gas in warfare, the Advisory Committee stated
that "there can be no actual restraint of the use by combatants of
this new agency of warfare, if it is permitted in any guise. ' 22 Accordingly, it introduced a resolution declaring that "chemical warfare, including the use of gases, whether toxic or nontoxic, should
be prohibited by international agreement ....
2,3 The General Board
19. Treaty on the Use of Submarines and Noxious Gases, art. 5 (1922), cited in
Baxter & Buergenthal, supra note 10, at 858.
20. CONFERENCE ON THE LIMITATION OF ARMAMENT, S. Doc. No. 126, 67th
Cong., 2d Sess. 384-85 (1922).
21. Id: at 386.
22. Id. at 385 (emphasis added).
23. HousE REPORT 17.
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of the Navy concurred, suggesting that although the use of tear gas
might not be strictly outlawed by the rules of war,
there will be great difficulty in a clear and definite demarcation
between the lethal gases and those which produce unnecessary suffering as distinguished from those gases which simply disable temporarily. .
[Tihe General Board believes it to be sound policy
to prohibit gas warfare in every form and against every 'objective,
and so recommends. 24
Secretary Hughes, in suggesting a final version of the provision of
this treaty banning gas warfare, stated that
despite the conclusions reached by the [technical subcommittee] ...
the American delegation, in the light of the advice of its advisory
committee . . . and of the specific recommendation of the General
Board of the Navy, felt that . . . the use of asphyxiating or poison

gas [should] be absolutely prohibited. 25

It may be questioned, whether the fact that the language of the
Versailles Treaty was used, rather than words indicating a broad prohibition of both toxic and nontoxic gases, is significant in view of
the fact that the United States delegation specifically relied on and
referred to the reports of the Advisory Committee and the General
Board of the Navy in its recommendation. Professors R. R. Baxter
and Thomas Buergenthal suggest that in light of the facts above it
is "most unlikely that a government which believed that Article 5
did not outlaw all forms of chemical warfare would have failed to
state its Views to the Conference." 2 6 This conclusion is borne out
by the Senate debate on the scope of the prohibition on gases, which
was limited to the question of whether the use of gases such as helium
and hydrogen for balloons would be prohibited, and did not discuss
27
the possible inclusion or exclusion of tear gas.
Professor George Bunn, however, suggests that statements made
by Senator Elihu Root, also a member of the American delegation,
argues to the contrary:
Root, who submitted the text to the conference, said it was drafted
in the language of the Treaty of Versailles
24.
25.
26.
27.

Baxter & Buergenthal, supra note 10, at 859.
Id. at 859-60.
Id. at 860.
Id. at 858.

. . .

because "between
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thirty and forty powers" had already agreed to that language, "so
that there was not much further to go in securing.., general consent
." Root understood the Versailles Treaty's "declaration against
the use of poison gases to be a statement of the previous rules which
had been adopted during the course of the Hague conferences."
As we have seen, these probably were never intended to apply to
28
tear gases.
Again, as in the Treaty of Versailles, the language of the prohibition
is ambiguous, and the negotiating history is not conclusive. However,
it may be suggested that a strong case can be made for a broad interpretation of the provision on gas warfare, which would include
tear gas within its prohibition.
C. Western Hemisphere Attempts
Of some significance for the customary international law reach
of the chemical warfare prohibition may be two actions of Western
Hemisphere nations indicating their concurrence in the outlawing
of chemical warfare. On February 7, 1923, a convention similar to
that embodied in the Washington Treaty was agreed to by the Central American Republics. Also, in 1923, eighteen American nations,
including the United States, adopted a recommendation at the Fifth
International Conference of American States at Santiago that all the
participating nations "reiterate" the biological and chemical warfare
prohibition of the Washington Treaty.2 However, the precedential
value of these agreements as evidence of customary international law
seems arguably slight. The lack of military significance of most of the
American states, the fact that the Washington Treaty never came
into effect, and the fact that the action taken at the Santiago conference was only a recommendation to "reiterate" and not a binding agreement, all combine to impart minimal impact to these 1923
actions.
D. The Geneva Protocol
The records of the Conference for the Supervision of the International Trade in Arms and Ammunition and in Implements of
28. Bunn, supra note 18, at 400; see text accompanying notes 16-18 supra.
29. O'Brien, Biological/Chemical Warfare and the International Law of War, 51
GEo. L.J. 1, 25-26 (1962).
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War, at which the Geneva Protocol was drafted, show no evidence
of discussion of the possible inclusion or exclusion of tear gas within
the scope of the Protocol's chemical warfare prohibition. Originally
it was the aim of the United States to prohibit the exportation from
the territory of the Contracting Parties of "all asphyxiating, poisonous,
or other gases, and of all analogous liquids, materials or devices,"
but this proposal was defeated because many of the chemicals involved had important peaceful uses, and the practical problems of
distinguishing between chemicals intended for war use and those
30
intended for industrial use would render enforcement difficult.
Therefore, the United States proposed that the chemical warfare prohibition adopt the language of the Washington Treaty, which in
turn embodied the ambiguous language of the Treaty of Versailles.
In spite of the lack of discussion of tear gas at the Conference
itself, however, it is significant to note that in the 1926 Senate debate on ratification of the Geneva Protocol at least some of the Senators interpreted the Protocol as prohibiting the use of tear gas in warfare. One of the main objections to ratification voiced was that the
Geneva Protocol would prohibit the use of tear gas, allegedly a more
humane method of warfare, and a method which United States domestic police employed. In a debate between Senators Borah and
Reed, Senator Reed stated:
This treaty would stop us from using [tear] gas against the next
savage race with which we find ourselves in war, and would compel us to blow them up, or stab them with bayonets, or riddle them
and sprinkle them with shrapnel, or puncture them with machinegun bullets, instead of blinding them for an hour or so until we
could disarm them. This is the "humanity" that is attempted to be
worked out by the Geneva Protocol. 3 '

Also significant is the fact that Congressman Theodore Burton, the
United States representative to the Geneva Conference, said that the
Protocol was "in accordance with our settled policy," and explained
that policy by reference to the reports of the General Board of the
Navy and the United States Advisory Committee to the Washington
Arms Conference, both of which recommended a broad prohibition
of all chemical gases. 32 Similarly, Mr. Philip Noel-Baker, who par30. Baxter & Buergenthal, supra note 10, at 861.
31. HousE REPORT 41.
32. Moore, supra note 15, at 433-34; see text accompanying notes 19-27 supra.
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ticipated as a British representative at the Conference, stated in a
1969 letter to The New York Times:
What does the Geneva Protocol on Chemical and Biological Warfare really mean? Does it allow the use in war of tear gas and
herbicides?
When I hear this question, I recall a talk I had in Geneva
while the Conference of 1925 was going on . . . with a young
French colleague, Henri Bonnet, later... Ambassador to the United

States.
"Oh yes," he said, "the form of words they've got is good. It
prohibits every kind of chemical or bacterial weapon that anyone
could possibly devise. And it has to. Perhaps someday a criminal
lunatic might invent some devilish thing that would destroy animals
and crops."
In 1925 everyone in the Conference agreed with Henri Bonnet.
It was their purpose to ban all C.B.3 weapons; and they were satisfied that the Protocol would do that. 3
There seemed to be no doubt at the time of the Conference that
the Geneva Protocol was broadly prohibitory, and that all forms of
chemical and biological warfare, whether or not known at the time the
Protocol was drawn up, were to be banned. It was only later, when
there was a substantial shift in American policy from an active advocacy of all disarmament efforts to a policy of "prohibition with
preparation," 34 that any question was raised as to a possible limitation
on the scope of the Protocol's prohibition.

II. PRACTICE SINCE 1925

A. PreparatoryCommission-1930
In 1930 the Preparatory Commission for the General Disarmament Conference of the League of Nations met to draft preliminary
disarmament resolutions. One of the issues discussed was chemicalbiological warfare, and a draft convention was drawn up based on
the French version of the Geneva Protocol which outlawed "similaires,"
rather than "other" gases as in the English version. This language
33.

Senate Hearings 263.

34. F.

BROWN, CHEMICAL WARFARE 109

(1968).

COMMENTS

prompted the British to state that it was their opinion that tear gas
was prohibited by the Geneva Protocol, and to request a statement of
interpretation from other signatory nations.3 5 France responded:
All the texts at present in force or proposed in regard to the
prohibition of the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or similar
gases are identical. In the French delegation's opinion, they apply
to all gases employed with a view to toxic action on the human
organism, whether the effects of such action are more or less temporary irritation of certain mucous membranes or whether they cause
serious or fatal lesions....
The French government therefore considers that the use of
lachrymatory gases is covered by the prohibition arising out of the
Geneva Protocol. 36
Of the sixteen other nations who were members of the Preparatory
Commission, ten concurred with the Franco-British interpretation.
Eight of these nations-Canada, China, Italy, Rumania, Spain, Turkey,
Yugoslavia, and the USSR-were also at that time parties to the
Geneva Protocol. Czechoslovakia became a party in 1938, as did
Japan in 1970, although the Japanese ratification was accompanied
by an informal understanding that tear gas was not prohibited by the
Protocol. The six other members of the Preparatory Commission who
were also parties to the Geneva Protocol did not respond.37 The United
States was the only member of the Preparatory Commission which
expressly objected to the British and French interpretation of the
Geneva Protocol, although because the United States was not a party
to the Protocol its spokesman, Hugh Gibson, couched his objections
in terms of the parameters that a future chemical warfare prohibition
should take on. He stated:
I think there would be considerable hesitation on the part of
many Governments to bind themselves to refrain from the use in
war, against an enemy, of agencies which they have adopted for
peace-time use against their own populations, agencies adopted on the
ground that, while causing temporary inconvenience, they cause no
real suffering or permanent disability, and are thereby more clearly
humane than the use of weapons to which they were formerly ob38
liged to resort to in times of emergency.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Baxter & Buergenthal, supra note 10, at 863.
Moore, supra note 15, at 460-61.
Id. at 461.
Baxter & Buergenthal, supra note 10, at 863.
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This line of reasoning, first voiced in the 1926 Senate debate on the
Protocol, has been the continuing basis of the United States' refusal to
ratify the Protocol. Because of this divergence of opinion, the Preparatory Commission announced in 1931 that "it was unable to express
a definite opinion on this question of interpretation."3 9
B. The League DisarmamentConference-1932-33
The language of the Geneva Protocol was not discussed at the
subsequent Disarmament Conference. However, the wording of the
resolution proposed by the Special Committee on Chemical-Biological
Warfare, and accepted by the United States, suggests a settled view that
the use of tear gas in war should be prohibited. The ban outlawed
all natural or
whether solid,
ritant, vesicant,
on the human
40

synthetic noxious substances, whatever their state,
liquid or gaseous, whether toxic, lachrymatory, iror capable in any way of producing harmful effects
or animal organism, whatever the method of their

use ....

There were several reasons advanced for the inclusion of tear gas
within this broad prohibition. The most important was that the term
"lachrymatory substances" does not define a chemical group, but
refers instead to the physiological effects of certain chemicals, and that
serious, even lethal, injuries could result if gases normally only irritating were used in sufficiently concentrated form. In addition, it was
noted that some lachrymatory substances had multiple uses. Thus
benzyl bromide, used by French police as an irritant agent, was also
the chemical most often employed for charging asphyxiating shells
during World War 1.41 It was also "feared that, if the use of lachrymatory substances were permitted, those used in war would not be the
harmless substances employed in most countries for police purposes,
but highly poisonous gases." 42 Further, it was thought that even if
mildly irritating lachrymatory gases were used, they might lead to the
use of sternutatory (sneeze-inducing) gases against which more elabo39. Department of State Report of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference 45 (1931), cited in Moore, supra note 15, at 461.
40. HOUSE REPORT 19.
41. 4 STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, THE PROBLEM
OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE 154 (1971) [hereinafter cited as SIPRI].
42. Id.
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rate protective devices would be required. 43 The rationale underlying
all these objections was that since a clear-cut definition of lachrymatory
agents could not be put forth, to establish a limited exception for
these substances would create possibilities for abuse, an invitation to
escalation, and would weaken the whole structure of disarmament. 44
Yet in spite of the breadth of this chemical warfare prohibition,
and the significance of the United States' acceptance of it, it is important to remember that no general disarmament agreement ever came
into effect. This was due to a number of factors, the most significant
being the German withdrawal from the League of Nations and subsequent rearmament, and the generally increasing impotency of the
League. In addition, one commentator has suggested that the widespread revulsion to chemical warfare after World War I, which was
capitalized upon by pacifist publicists, resulted in an overestimation
of the importance to national security of chemical weaponry. 45 Because
of this misconception, shared by the public at large and high government officials of all nations, the question of chemical-biological disarmament became much more difficult.
In a situation where CB weapons were regarded as of rather doubtful military value, a less than perfect disarmament scheme might
have been acceptable; but in the present context this would not
do. The conference debate about the difficulties of verifying the observance of chemical disarmament agreements, which reverted again
and again to the question of convertibility [of peacetime chemical
industries to military use] without ever resolving it, has left its mark
on all subsequent discussions of the problem. 46
Since no final disarmament agreement ever came into force, the question arises as to the weight which should be accorded the Disarmament
Conference resolution in interpreting the Geneva Protocol. One recent
source stresses the importance of the notice aspect of the Preparatory
Commission and the Disarmament Conference. 47 Its authors conclude
that because no then-party to the Geneva Protocol entered an objection to the Franco-British interpretation in 1930, and no party which
has subsequently become a party has entered a reservation excluding
43. Id.
44. Id. at 19-20.
45.

1 id. 51-54.

46. Id. at 254.
47. Baxter & Buergenthal, supra note 10, at 864.
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tear gas from the Protocols' scope, its prohibition of tear gas
must be considered to be extremely clear. The fact that Japan felt
it necessary to ratify the Protocol with an informal understanding that
it did not include tear gas supports this position. On the other hand,
"while the intent to include tear gas in the prohibition on gases in the
Disarmament Convention was unmistakable, it is often stressed that
these negotiations were not attempting to interpret the Geneva Protocol, but rather, were seeking a new and separate disarmament agreement," 48 and that therefore the Disarmament Convention has no
evidentiary value for the Protocol.
C. The Late 1930's
In the late 1930's, allegations were made of the use of poisonous
and tear gases in three conflicts: by the Italians against Ethiopia in
1935 and 1936,49 by both sides in the Spanish Civil War in 1936 and
1937,50 and by Japan against China in 1938-1941.r' The allegations were
substantiated in the first and last instances, while no conclusive evidence exists as to the Spanish Civil War. The Japanese freely admitted
the use of irritant gases, but stated that they did not consider the use
of such gases to be contrary to international law because they did
not cause death or permanent injury.5 2 The League of Nations failed to
move effectively against Italy and Japan. Although some economic
sanctions were applied against Italy they were inadequate and came
too late, and by the time allegations of Japanese aggression against
China were made the international situation had so far deteriorated
that it was "impossible for the League to give even moral assistance
53
to China."
D. World War II
The precedent set by the ineffective response of the League of
Nations to the use of chemical weapons by Italy seemed ominous. In
April, 1936, the British Prime Minister queried:
48.
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If these allegations of the use of poison gas be true-and I have
every reason to believe that they are true-the peril I see to the
world is this: if a great European nation, in spite of having given
its signature to the Geneva protocol against the use of such gases,
employs them in Africa, what guarantee have we that they may
not be used in Europe? 54
Thus, it is somewhat surprising that during World War II there was
complete abstention from the use of chemical weaponry including
tear gas. There have been a number of reasons advanced for this, primary among them being the fear of reprisal. Hitler and Roosevelt
had a strong personal aversion to the use of gas in military combat, the
former because he had been gassed during World War I, and there were
many military men in all nations who did not understand chemical
warfare and were generally distrustful of it. The active publicity campaign mounted by pacifist groups during the interwar period had
greatly exaggerated the destructive potential of chemical warfare; this
misconception was compounded by a generous overestimation by all belligerents of the quality and quantity of their enemies' chemical warfare
stockpiles. Finally, there were only a limited number of situations in
which the use of chemical weapons would have provided a decisive military advantage; these were more than counterbalanced by the uncertainty of retaliation, and the fear that "a chemical mortar action in
some distant combat theatre, even with irritant-agent projectiles, might
be met by the gas bombing of a capital city." 55 The legal constraints
against use of chemical warfare were generally quite irrelevant to the
decision made not to use gas, because of the overriding practical constraints of "lack of military interest . . . fear of retaliation and lack of
material capability."' 56 But the legal constraints were significant "because of their influence in retarding acceptance of gas as a standard
weapon of war, and hence in their contribution to the belligerents'
overall unpreparedness to wage CW, and their leaders' unwillingness to
authorize it." 5
Thus, when the war broke out, Britain, France, Germany, and
Italy all pledged to observe the Geneva Protocol; Japan responded
ambiguously. A State Department suggestion that the United States
advise Japan that we would adhere to the terms of the Geneva Protocol
54.
55.
56.
57.
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on the basis of reciprocity was rejected in February, 1942, by Secretary
of War Stimson because of his concern over our lack of preparedness
to retaliate if Japan used gas warfare.58 However, in June, 1942, President Roosevelt, responding to pressure from the Chinese, stated that
we would retaliate heavily against Japan if she continued to use gas
against China or any other American ally, and in June, 1943, issued the
following statement in response to rumors of imminent German use
of gas:
From time to time since the present war began there have
been reports that one or more of the Axis powers were seriously
contemplating use of poisonous or noxious gases or other inhumane
device of warfare.
Use of such weapons has been outlawed by the general opinion

of civilized mankind. This country has not used them, and I hope
that we never will be compelled to use them. I state categorically
that we shall under no circumstances resort to the use of such
weapons unless they are first used by our enemies.
[A]cts of this nature committed against any one of the United
Nations [the Allies] will be regarded as having been committed
against the United States itself and will be treated accordingly.
We promise to any perpetrators of such crimes full and swift retaliation in kind.59
In neither his 1942 nor his 1943 declaration did Roosevelt refer to the
Geneva Protocol.
Toward the end of the Pacific war the use of poison gas was urged
by some members of the military as a way to reduce American casualties in the island campaigns. However, Admiral Nimitz decided that
"the United States should not be the first to violate the Geneva Convention." 60 Similarly, a memo concerning the possible use of herbicides
prepared by General Myron Cramer, the Judge Advocate General of
the Army, for the Secretary of War stated:
The United States is not bound by any treaty which specifically
excludes or restricts the use of chemicals, whether toxic or nontoxic in time of war.

.

.

. An exhaustive study of the source

materials, however, warrants the conclusion that a customary rule
58. Bunn, supra note 18, at 382.
59. 8 DEP'T STATE BULL. 507 (1943) (emphasis added).
60. Moore, supra note 15, at 436.
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of international law had developed by which poisonous gases and
those causing unnecessary sufferings are prohibited ... . The United
States has officially announced that it will observe this principle .... 61
Both these statements indicate an implicit recognition of the major
disadvantages of a change in the only recently declared United States
policy of no first use of chemical weapons. "To reverse this within so
short a time would not be in keeping with U.S. aspirations for moral
leadership of the world in the coming post-war years." 62
E. The Korean War and Beyond
During the Korean War the United States used tear and vomiting
gases to suppress rioting prisoners of war, apparently on the theory
that this was not a use in war but was analogous to domestic riot control. 63 Allegations were made by China and North Korea that the
United States was using germ warfare, but a United States denial and
suggestion that an international investigatory commission be set up
was rejected. One commentator has speculated that "[a]lthough not
decisive, our failure to use gas in Korea and our defense against the
germ warfare charge are evidence that we believed the use of poison
gas and germ warfare to be wrong." 64
After the Korean War a perceptible alteration in State and
Defense Department attitudes toward chemical warfare became evident: "U.S. military authorities were beginning to move away from
the doctrine of massive retaliation to one of flexible response, and a
case [was] made that, in the absence of a first-use prohibition, CB
weapons were suited to this new doctrine." 65 Responding to this change,
Congressman Robert Kastenmeir introduced a resolution which affirmed "the longstanding policy of the United States that in the event
of war the United States shall under no circumstances resort to the use
of biological weapons or the use of poisonous or noxious gases unless
61. 10 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1300, 1305 (M. Righini ed. 1971) (emphasis in
original). The memo goes on to suggest that herbicides are not within the scope of the
prohibition.
62. 1 SIPRI 331.
63. HousE REPORT 27.
64. Bunn, supranote 18, at 383.
65. 5 SIPRI 127.

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

they are first used by our enemies." 0 6 In January, 1960, President
Eisenhower was questioned about a possible policy change; his reply
was that "no such official suggestion has been made to me and so far
as my own instinct is concerned, is to not start such a thing as that
first." 67 However, both the State and Defense Departments lobbied
heavily against the Kastenmeir resolution enunciating the necessity
of retaining presidential discretion. The Chemical Corps, formerly the
Chemical Warfare Services, launched an active publicity campaign to
increase public acceptance of chemical weaponry, and in Congressional
testimony painted a picture of "war without death" by showing, inter
alia, a film of a cat which had been given LSD cowering in front of a
mouse. The result was a five-fold increase in the Chemical Corps
budget and a greatly enlarged stockpile of nerve gases and biological
weapons. 68 The tone and intensity of the debate suggested that the
concern of the State and Defense Departments was focused on the
"propriety of using chemical and biological weapons generally rather
than the wisdom of imposing less restrictive controls on the use of
riot-control or anti-plant agents." 6 9
F. Vietnam

That the United States was considering a major change in its
chemical warfare policy was borne out by its practice in Vietnam.
Between 1964 and 1969, 13.7 million pounds of tear gas were used by
United States forces there. 70 While North Vietnam and the Viet Cong
also used tear gas, they did not initiate its use. The three principal
types of "riot-control" agents used by the United States were DM
(adamsite), CN (chloroacetophenone), and CS (orthochlorobenzalmalononitrile). The use of DM, a vomiting gas, by United States
forces was apparently eliminated sbmetime in the late 1960's. CN is
the major type of tear gas used by United States domestic police, while
CS, which is simultaneously the most irritating and the least toxic,
was the "riot-control agent" most used in Vietnam. CS-1 and CS-2 are
forms of CS which are made more persistent by coating particles of
66. Decker & Dunlap, War, Genetics and the Law, 1 ECOLOGY L.Q. 795, 813
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CS with silicone so that they are able to produce irritating fumes for
as long as forty-five days after the initial spraying.
The original justification for the use of tear gas in Vietnam was
that it would save the lives of innocent civilians who were being used
by enemy soldiers as human shields; by rendering the enemy and
civilians helpless, tear gas would enable the enemy to be captured and
the civilians to be set free. 7 ' In practice, however,
[a]s the effectiveness of these riot-control agents in reducing casualties became increasingly evident in such situations as suppression
of hostile firepower and clearance of fortified positions and underground facilities, American commanders at all levels began to see
other ways in which the use of the riot-control agents, particularly
the new agent CS, could save many American and allied lives. As a
result, its applicability to [normal combat] operations spread among
U.S. units in Vietnam. 72
A twofold shift in emphasis became apparent: an increasing concern for the lives of American and South Vietnamese troops as opposed
to those of innocent civilians or the Viet Cong, and an acceptance of
the use of tear gas for purposes disconsonant with the notion of humane
weaponry.
[L]arge numbers of tear gas grenades [were] dropped on Viet Cong
strongholds from helicopters which were followed by B-52's dropping
high-explosive or anti-personnel-fragmentation bombs. The purpose,
of such an attack would appear to be to flush out those hiding
in tunnels, to incapacitate them with gas, and then to wound or
with the hukill them with bombs. This seems wholly inconsistent
78
manitarian justification given by the United States.
Another aspect of the United States' use of "riot-control agents" in
Vietnam was that while tear gas does not ordinarily have any deleterious effects, the generally poor health of the Vietnamese people,
especially the young, old, and pregnant, made them much more
susceptible to negative, and even fatal, effects from ,tear gas. Reports
from a Canadian doctor and others in Vietnam indicate that a number
of children and adults were killed by tear gas attacks on the cave or
71. Statement of J. Nabrit, United States Deputy Representative to the United
Nations, Housa, REPORT 22.

72. Statement of Rear Admiral William E. Lemos, Hearings Before the.,:Subcomm. on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments of the House Foreign
Affairs Comm., cited in Senate Hearings54 (emphasis added).
73. Bunn, supra note 18, at 405-06.
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bunker in which they were hiding. Those that were not killed de1 74
veloped a "chronic bronchitic [condition] complicated by infections.
"[R]epeated respiratory disease as a complication of parasitosis is very
common in Vietnamese children," and tuberculosis is "a common
disease among peasants in Asia." 75 Since both these conditions are
easily aggravated by exposure to any irritating gas, it appears likely
that a concentration of tear gas even moderately higher than normal
could cause serious injury or death. Thus, weaponry which was
humane for domestic police enforcement became significantly less
76
humane in a combat situation.
G. Other Developments Since 1960
From 1963 to 1967 a number of allegations were made of Egyptian chemical warfare attacks on Royalist villages in the Yemini Civil
War. Only three of the allegations are well substantiated, but these
three indicate that tear gases were used first in 1963, and that later, in
1967, mustard gas and phosgene were used. The United Nations did
not take any action on these allegations, other than attempting to
verify them. One explanation put forward for this inaction was that
no nation was willing to push publicly for sanctions, that the conflict
was inter-Arab, and that by the time well-documented allegations were
received, promising negotiations were underway between the United
Arab Republic and Saudi Arabia, who were the backers of the rival
77
Yemini factions.
In February, 1970, Great Britain announced a change in its previously broad interpretation of the chemical warfare prohibition of the
Geneva Protocol. Its new position is "that although the British government [has] not changed its position that tear gases are prohibited by
the [Geneva] Protocol, it [does] not interpret this ban as extending
to CS-the principal tear gas relied on . . . by Great Britain in
Northern Ireland." 8 Great Britain explained this apparent inconsistency by noting that CS is "not significantly harmful to man in other
74. 1 SIPRI 206.
75. Id. at 207.
76. For a general survey of United States practice in Vietnam, see Senate Hearing
12-15, 54-55, 270-73; HousE REPORT 3-5, 28-32; Bunn, supra note 18, at 394, 40506; Moore, supra note 15, 439-41
77. 1 SIPRI 159-61; 4 id. at 243-47; 5 id. at 225-38.
78. Moore, supra note 15, at 464.
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than wholly exceptional circumstances .... CS is in fact less toxic than
the screening smokes which the 1930 statement specifically excluded." 79
Although the British position is not wholly logical, it seems distinguishable from that of the United States because Britain's use of CS is
still confined to traditional riot-control situations, while United States
use in Vietnam extended to full-scale warfare.
As noted above, when Japan acceded to the Geneva Protocol in
1970, it did so under an informal understanding that the Protocol
did not prohibit tear gas. According to recent testimony before the
Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments, "no state party to the [Geneva] [P]rotocol has officially objected
to the Japanese interpretation of that instrument."8 0
H. United Nations Action
Responding to the United States' use of tear gas and herbicides in
Vietnam, the United Nations General Assembly, beginning in 1966,
passed a series of resolutions condemning the use of gas in warfare.
On November 7, 1966, Hungary introduced a resolution demanding
strict compliance by all nations with the terms of the Geneva Protocol,
stressing that it had become binding international law through the
customary adherence of nations to its principles, and that the United
States had violated this rule of customary international law by its
practice in Vietnam. 8 ' The United States responded that neither the
Geneva Protocol nor any subsequent rule of customary international
law prohibited the use of tear gas in warfare. Echoing the 1926 debate
on ratification of the Protocol, the United States Deputy Representative to the United Nations stated:
The Geneva Protocol of 1925 . . . was framed to meet the horrors
of poison gas warfare in the first World War and was intended to
reduce suffering by prohibiting the use of poisonous gases such as
mustard gas and phosgene. It does not apply to all gases. It would
be unreasonable to contend that any rule of international law prohibits the use in combat against an enemy, for humanitarian purposes, of agents that Governments around
the world commonly
82
use to control riots by their own people.
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Because of an inability to agree on the scope of either the Geneva
Protocol or the customary international law prohibition, an amended
resolution, for which the United States voted, was drafted.
[It] merely "calls for strict observance by all States of the principles
and objectives of the Geneva Protocol . . . and condemns all actions
contrary to those objectives," and invites all States which have not
done so to accede to the Protocol. No reference is made which
might be construed as an interpretation of the wording of the protocol, particularly with regard to tear gas and herbicides.83
In 1967, Malta suggested in a resolution to the First Committee of
the United Nations that the language of the Geneva Protocol be
revised because of technical developments which now made the language of the Protocol exclude some seriously deleterious agents (such
as psychochemicals, which are neither "gaseous" nor "liquid" and
can have effects neither "asphyxiating" or "poisonous"), while including less harmless chemicals "because their basic characteristics and
effects were included in the language of the ban."8' 4 The USSR
opposed this resolution because it felt that to change the Geneva
Protocol would eliminate its status as "a universally acknowledged
norm of contemporary international law binding on all powers,"8 8
and supported a new broadly prohibitive Hungarian resolution. Because of inability to negotiate a compromise resolution, both the
Maltese and Hungarian resolutions were dropped.
A December, 1968 United Nations resolution set up a scientific
study group to determine the nature and effects of chemical-biological
weaponry and to prepare a report giving their findings. While dealing
mainly with chemical and biological agents other than tear gas, and
concluding that the likelihood of the latter's having lethal effects was
extremely small, the report did suggest that
even though these substances may be less toxic than most other
chemical agents, their ill-considered use, or use for military purposes
could turn out to be highly dangerous ....
Once any chemical or
bacteriological (biological) weapon had been used in warfare, there
would be a serious risk of escalation, both in the use of more dan83.
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gerous weapons belonging to the same class and of other weapons
of mass destruction.86
In November, 1969, Sweden introduced a resolution which stated
that "the Geneva Protocol embodies the generally recognized rules of
international law prohibiting the use in international armed conflicts
of all biological and chemical methods of warfare, regardless of any
technical developments," 87 and that the prohibition of the Geneva
Protocol included "any chemical agents of warfare ... which might be
employed because of their direct toxic effect on man, animals, or
88
plants." The latter language was clearly intended to include tear gas.
There have been varying interpretations given to the vote on this
resolution, which was 80 in favor, 36 abstentions, and 3 against (the
United States, Portugal, and Australia). Many of the abstentions were
on the ground that the United Nations General Assembly was an
inappropriate forum for treaty interpretation, and that such interpretation should be left to the parties of the treaty. This was the position
of many abstaining NATO nations who were signatories of the Protocol, and also of the United States. 89 It is likely that one reason for
the high number of abstentions among NATO nations was a desire
not to offend the United States regardless of their actual beliefs concerning the scope of the Protocol. Different sources have used the
statistics of the voting on this resolution to support somewhat different conclusions. Gellner and Wu state that "more than one-third
of the parties and signatories to the protocol neither favored nor opposed the protocol. These facts could prevent the resolution from
being an undisputed legal interpretation of the Geneva Protocol."9' 0
Baxter and Buergenthal, on the other hand, emphasize that
[a]lthough the vote cannot be regarded as a resounding affirmation
of the proposition that irritant chemicals fall under the prohibition
of the Protocol, the large number of states voting in favor of the
resolution indicates that there is a very substantial amount of support for that view.
These few dissenting voices and thirty-six states whose silence
86. Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and the Effects of Their
Possible Use (1968), cited in HousE- REPORT 23.
87. G.A. Res. 2603, 24 U.N. GAOR Supp. 30, at 16, U.N. Doc. A/7630 (1969).
88. Housn R PORT 24.
89. Id. at 25.
90. Id.
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supports neither one construction nor the other do not evidence any
strong enthusiasm for a restrictive interpretation of the Protocol. 1
III. OPTIONS

AND

CONCLUSIONS

The ongoing negotiations at the Conference of the Committee on
Disarmament, the Convention for the Prohibition of Development,
Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons
(which requires ratification by the United States to enter into effect),
and the recent appropriations request by the Pentagon for production

of binary nerve gases all point to the urgency of United States ratification of the Geneva Protocol as the basic document prohibiting
chemical and biological warfare. What continues to divide the Administration and the Senate and prevent Senate advice and consent to
ratification is the question of the inclusion of tear gas and herbicides
within the scope of the Protocol's prohibition. As has been shown
above, the negotiating history of'the Protocol, and of the Washington
and Versailles treaties which preceded it, is not conclusive on the
issue of tear gas although there is strong evidence supporting an interpretation of the Protocol that is broadly prohibitive. In addition, the
subsequent statements and practice of nations, with the exception of
the United States, evidence nearly unanimous concurrence in the view
that the use of tear gas in war is prohibited by the Geneva Protocol.
Given, then, an ambiguous negotiating history and a current climate
of world opinion which, with the exception of Japan and Britain, is
strongly in favor of a total ban on the use of gas in warfare, what are
the present options of the. United States?
One option is to ratify the Protocol with the single reservation
and the informal understanding proposed by the Administration. The
proposed reservation states: "That the said Protocol shall cease to be
binding on the Government of the United States with respect to the
use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all
analogous liquids, materials, or devices, in regard to an enemy State
if such State or any of its allies fails to respect the prohibitions laid
down in the Protocol." 92 Its effect is to turn the Prohibition into a
"no-first-use" prohibition in regard to chemical warfare, and is similar
91.
92.
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in this respect to reservations made by almost every other signatory
nation. It is, however, dissimilar to reservations made by most nations
in that it does not limit the obligations of the United States to other
parties to the Protocol, and in that it renounces absolutely the use in
war of biological and toxin weapons.
The understanding to which the Administration would like the
Senate to agree is that the Protocol "does not prohibit the use in war
of riot-control agents and chemical herbicides." 9 3 The problem with
this "understanding" is that it offers only meretricious advantages and
provides no real legal protection to the United States or any addition
to its national security. Because the "understanding" is only a "whisper
in the ear of the Senate" and is not to be formally deposited with the
ratification,
[t]he danger . . . is that if one state such as the United States ...
where to say that tear gas is permissible and were to use it, the
other side would then say that there has been a clear violation of
the Geneva protocol [because it prohibits the use of all gas in war],
will feel liberated from the obligations of the protocol, and will
consider itself entitled to resort to any sort of gas or herbicide that
it may think proper to employ .... 94 [I]f the matter were ever to

be litigated or discussed in any forum which could reach a decision
on the question, the U.S. pronouncement would be simply "one
man's opinion" and would carry no international legal effect. 95
There is some disagreement on this point. Another international
lawyer has suggested that
[g]iven the ambiguities in the text of the protocol, the statement
would most likely be accepted as an interpretation of an ambiguous
provision, rather than a reservation [going to the heart of the
protocol, which it clearly is not] . .

.

. Thus we would become a

party to the Protocol with a clear understanding on tear gas and
herbicides as far as most parties were concerned. 96
A second alternative is to ratify the Geneva Protocol with an
explicit reservation of the right to use tear gas and herbicides in
war. This has the advantage of making clear our position, and allowing
the exact definition of the legal relations between the United States
93.
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and other parties to the Protocol. The law governing treaties and
reservations thereto being "very much like the law of offer and
counteroffer," any nation that did not voice objection to the reserva9 If
tion would be presumed to have accepted it.
a country did object
to the United States' reservation, something which has not happened
with any other reservation made to the Protocol, then two results are
possible: Either the particular provision affected by the reservation
would not enter into force between the objecting and the reserving
state, or the treaty as a whole would not come into effect.08 The latter
seems much more likely because the Geneva Protocol
is so short and so highly integrated an instrument that it is very
difficult to think of segregating out the provision which is affected
by a reservation and saying that this will not be in force but that
all the rest of the protocol will be. The reservation actually goes
to the very guts of the obligation-the type of chemical agents which
are covered by the protocol.99
Even if the United States' reservation were accepted, there would be
the problem of definition, of specifying exactly what is a riot-control or
lachrymatory agent or a chemical herbicide. As noted above in the
discussion of the 1932 Disarmament Conference, it is very difficult to
determine which chemicals fall within the lachrymatory category and
there is always the risk that, intentionally or otherwise, a newly developed chemical weapon would be labeled a riot-control agent when
in fact its effects were much more deleterious and long-lasting. If this
were to occur, the Protocol would be effectively scuttled. That is why
it has always been felt so important-whether today, at the 1932 Disarmament Conference, and at least arguably, at the time of the drafting of the Geneva Protocol itself-that the prohibition on chemical
warfare be absolute.
On the other hand, ratification with a formal reservation has two
advantages over ratification with an undeposited "understanding."
Even if a number of important states objected to the United States'
ratification of the Geneva Protocol with such a reservation thereby
preventing the Protocol from coming into effect between the United
States and the objecting nation, the United States would know exactly
where it stood legally, and would have the opportunity to reconsider
97. House Hearings 127.
98. Id.
99. Id.
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in the face of such a strong and unequivocal statement of world
opinion the importance, militarily and politically, of retaining the
right to first use of tear gas and herbicides. It then might decide to
ratify without reservation.
The third option open to the United States is to ratify the Protocol
with only the limited "no-first-use" reservation proposed by former
Secretary of State Rogers, without any "understanding" of a limitation
on the scope of the Protocol. The advantages to this approach are
several. Ratification in this manner would make the legal position of
the United States very clear, and leave no possibility of difficult questions of interpretation arising in times of conflict. But most important,
ratification without reservation as to the scope of the prohibition
would help ensure the fulfillment of the basic purpose of the Protocol
-the outlawing of all forms of chemical and biological warfare. Ratification without reservation would certainly produce a favorable
world reaction. Furthermore, it would establish the momentum
needed for the ratification of the Convention for the Prohibition of
the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological and
Toxin Weapons, and for substantial progress at the Conference of the
Committee on Disarmament.
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